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INTRODUCTION
The Heller and McDonald decisions rendered certain gun control
measures unconstitutional. This Article discusses the kinds of gun
control that still may be constitutionally permissible in light of those
decisions. It also analyzes which kinds of gun control are effective,
first reviewing evidence on the fundamental underlying issue of
whether gun ownership levels affect violence rates. This Article then
outlines the major forms that gun control efforts have taken and
critically reviews the research evidence concerning the impact of gun
control measures on crime. Finally, the Conclusion outlines the types
of constitutionally permissible gun control policies that should be
implemented to reduce crime.
I. WHAT CANNOT BE DONE: CONSTITUTIONALLY
IMPERMISSIBLE GUN C ONTROL
In District of Columbia v. Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago,
the Supreme Court established that the Second Amendment protects
an individual’s right to own a gun for personal use and that neither
the federal government nor state or local governments can abridge
this right.1 More specifically, the Court ruled that there is a
constitutional right to keep a loaded handgun at home for selfdefense.2 Thus, it seems clear that governments may not completely
forbid the ownership of handguns, or of all guns, or require that all
guns kept in the home remain unloaded.

1. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
2. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29.
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II. WHAT MAY STILL BE PERMISSIBLE
Beyond these limitations, it remains unclear what other gun control
measures, if any, are now constitutionally impermissible. Because the
decisions explicitly addressed the possession of guns in the home, it
remains possible that governments could completely forbid the
possession of firearms outside the home. Possession in the home can
be restricted in a variety of ways short of total prohibition. For
example, after the McDonald decision struck down Chicago’s
handgun ban, the city of Chicago quickly responded by implementing
a revised ordinance that forbade keeping more than one handgun
assembled and operable in the home.3
Likewise, the Court did not explicitly forbid the enactment of laws
establishing restrictive firearms licensing laws and ordinances. New
York City requires residents to have a pistol permit to own a handgun
legally, but the law is administered so stringently that virtually no
residents of New York City other than retired police officers are able
to get a permit.4 It costs $431.50 just to apply for a handgun license
(including fingerprinting charges), the fees are nonrefundable, and
the odds are stacked heavily against the application being approved.5
For example, in 1987, only twenty-one percent of applications were
approved.6 Applicants may be denied if they had a moving violation
in their driving history, failed to get fingerprinted, or failed to provide
all the voluminous paperwork and documentation required.7 The
application must include two color photographs of specified size, a
birth certificate, proof of current address, a letter of necessity, and for
some applicants, copies of the applicant’s business sales tax report, a

3. See CHI., ILL. CODE § 8-20-040 (2010).
4. See Jarrett Murphy, Are New York City’s Gun Laws the Next Target?, CITY
LIMITS (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.citylimits.org/news/articles/4618/are-new-yorkcity-s-gun-laws-the-next-target.
5. See POLICE DEP’T CITY OF N.Y., INSTRUCTIONS TO HANDGUN LICENSE
APPLICANTS (2012), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/
permits/HandGunLicenseApplicationFormsComplete.pdf.
6. Bethany Kandel, Goetz Sentenced in Gun Case Today, USA TODAY, Oct. 19,
1987, at 3A.
7. See POLICE DEP’T CITY OF N.Y., supra note 5. This document includes a
detailed five-page application form and eleven more pages of supplementary forms
and instructions, including forms in which the applicant swears that he is familiar with
all local, state, and federal laws and regulations related to handgun possession, which
must be signed and notarized. See POLICE DEP’T CITY OF N.Y., HANDGUN LICENSE
APPLICATION (2010), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/
permits/HandGunLicenseApplicationFormsComplete.pdf.
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personal income tax return, daily bank deposit slips, and a variety of
bank statements.8
In short, it is so difficult to own a handgun in New York City
legally that less than one percent of New York City residents have
obtained the license authorizing them to possess a handgun.9 The
burden of proof under New York City law is on the would-be
handgun owner to show high moral character and a special need for a
handgun.10 Few are able to meet that burden. The New York City
law therefore appears to function effectively as a de facto ban on
handgun possession even though it is not written explicitly as a ban.
It remains to be seen whether this sort of semi-ban is constitutionally
impermissible, but if New York City’s gun laws are constitutional, it is
unlikely that any existing gun laws, or any but the tiniest share of
politically achievable future gun control measures, would be ruled
unconstitutional.
The actual impact of Heller and McDonald on gun control
restriction in America may well turn out to be negligible. No other
large cities besides Washington, D.C. and Chicago—and no states—
have enacted outright bans on private possession of handguns or of
guns in general.11 There are no signs that any would have done so in
the foreseeable future if Heller and McDonald had been decided
differently. If this pair of decisions only forbids outright bans, and
later decisions do not significantly increase the scope of measures
considered to be unconstitutional, it is unlikely that many significant
existing gun control measures would be taken off the books. In sum,
it is not clear that any further gun laws will be struck down (beyond
the handful of local gun bans in those small towns in Illinois) or that
any politically achievable gun control proposals will have to be
withdrawn due to constitutional concerns as a result of Heller and
McDonald. Furthermore, it may not be politically feasible to enact
outright gun bans in the foreseeable future. Only twenty-six percent
of U.S. adults supported banning the private possession of handguns
in an October 2011 national survey.12 Thus, if Heller and McDonald
forbid only outright gun bans, they will neither preclude enactment of
8. See sources cited supra note 7.
9. See Murphy, supra note 4.
10. See supra note 4.
11. See D.C. CODE § 7-2502.01 (2012); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. 65/1 (2012).
12. See Guns, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1645/guns.aspx (last visited
Nov. 20, 2012); see also Jeffrey M. Jones, Record-Low 26% in U.S. Favor Handgun
Ban, GALLUP (Oct. 26, 2011), http://www.gallup.com/poll/150341/Record-Low-FavorHandgun-Ban.aspx.
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any new gun laws that would otherwise have been politically
achievable nor require the repeal or revision of any significant
existing gun laws beyond the two they have already negated.13
On the other hand, it is possible that the scope of what is
considered unconstitutional may be expanded in the future as the
Court extends or elaborates on Heller and McDonald, especially if
the composition of the Court changes in a conservative, pro-gun
direction. Thus, it is worth thinking about whether anything
significant in the way of crime control and violence prevention would
be lost if any existing gun control laws were struck down. What does
existing research have to say about the effectiveness of gun laws? If
they are ineffective, no crime control would be lost by expanded
interpretations of the protections of the Second Amendment, no
matter how extensive the protections might prove to be.
III. DO GUN LEVELS AFFECT VIOLENCE?
A more fundamental preliminary question, however, is whether
gun availability actually increases crime and violence. If it does not,
there is little utilitarian justification for gun control. While many gun
control advocates undoubtedly favor stricter gun laws for nonutilitarian reasons, such as a cultural antipathy towards gun owners,14
few openly rest their case for controls on these grounds.15 If gun
availability does affect the rates or seriousness of crime and violence,
then laws that are effective in reducing gun availability may reduce
rates of violence.
Most studies of the impact of gun ownership levels on rates of
crime and violence are fatally flawed.16 Nearly all of them make at
least one, but usually all of the three critical errors: (1) they use
invalid measures of gun ownership levels; (2) they fail to make any
serious effort to control for the effects on crime of other factors
correlated with gun ownership (“confounding factors”); or (3) they
fail to distinguish the effect of gun levels on crime rates from the
13. For examples of the gun laws that were not subject to repeal, see sources cited

supra note 11.
14. See Gary Kleck et al., Why Do People Support Gun Control?: Alternative
Explanations of Support for Handgun Bans, 37 J. CRIM. JUST. 496, 497–98 (2009)
[hereinafter Kleck et al., Why do People Support Gun Control?].
15. See generally BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, LEGAL ACTION
PROJECT LITIGATION DOCKET (Jan. 2012), available at http://www.bradycenter.org/
xshare/pdf/lap/cases/currentdocket.pdf.
16. See Gary Kleck, How Not to Study the Effect of Gun Levels on Violence
Rates, 21 J. FIREARMS & PUB. POL’Y 65, 65-93 (2009).
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effect of crime rates on gun ownership.17 Only three studies have
avoided these three problems, and all found there was no net crimeincreasing effect on gun ownership levels.18
Thus, the overall rate of gun ownership in the population as a
whole has no net effect on crime rates, including homicide rates.19
Consequently, even if gun control measures could reduce general gun
ownership levels, there is no sound reason to believe this would cause
a reduction in crime rates. On the other hand, gun control measures
might reduce gun levels within some high-risk subsets of the
population, such as convicted criminals. Indeed, few gun control
measures are intended to reduce overall gun levels.20 In fact, they
might reduce crime in other ways that do not require reducing gun
ownership levels, such as reducing the availability of guns in public
places or deterring criminal use of guns through harsh penalties.21
Thus, some gun control interventions might still be effective even
though higher overall gun levels do not increase crime.
In the review that follows, the conclusions I draw are based on the
findings of the methodologically strongest research done on each gunrelated intervention. They are not based on crude “vote counting” to
determine the most frequent findings. This is a crucial distinction
because the vast majority of research in this area is, like the research
on the effect of gun levels on crime rates, fatally flawed and the
findings of most studies therefore can be given little weight.22 Making
matters worse, most research published in medical and public health
journals is not only technically primitive, but also shows distinct signs

17. See id.
18. See Gary Kleck & E. Britt Patterson, The Impact of Gun Control and Gun
Ownership Levels on Violence Rates, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 239 (1993)
[hereinafter Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates]; Tomislav Kovandzic, Mark
Schaffer, & Gary Kleck, Gun Prevalence, Homicide Rates and Causality: A GMM
Approach to Endogeneity Bias, THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF CRIMINOLOGICAL
RESEARCH METHODS 76-92 (David Gadd, Susanne Karstedt, & Steven F. Messner
eds., 2012); Tomislav Kovandzic, Mark Schaffer, & Gary Kleck, Estimating the

Causal Effect of Gun Prevalence on Homicide Rates: A Local Average Treatment
Effect Approach, 28 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming Sept. 2013).
19. See Kleck et al., Why Do People Support Gun Control?, supra note 14, at 502.
See generally GARY KLECK, TARGETING GUNS: FIREARMS AND THEIR CONTROL
(1997) [hereinafter KLECK, TARGETING GUNS].
20. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19.
21. See id. at 366.
22. For a discussion of examples of fatally flawed research, see infra Part V.
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of ideological bias.23 In practice, this means one technically sound study
can outweigh a dozen fatally flawed studies. The conclusions of this
Article are based on the studies that, though typically few in number,
most closely hewed to the methods prescribed in research methods
textbooks.
IV. FORMS OF GUN CONTROL
Gun control can take many forms and is not limited to laws and
ordinances. Indeed, most efforts to limit gun ownership in recent
decades have not been aimed at creating new legislation.24 As state
and local governments increasingly have become dominated by
Republicans and conservative Democrats, prospects for gaining
stricter gun laws have become dimmer and gun control advocates
have sought other avenues for limiting guns that did not require the
support of legislative majorities.25 Before discussing gun control laws,
it is worth reviewing some of the other methods of gun control.
First, however, I should stress what this Article does not cover. It
does not cover (1) evaluations of policy interventions that were
putatively aimed at “reducing gun violence” but that did not actually
include any gun-specific elements, or (2) evaluations of interventions
composed of multiple elements, some gun-related and others not, but
that did not separately assess the gun-related elements. One example
of an intervention that does not involve any gun-oriented elements
aside from the nature of offenders targeted are “Gun Court”
programs, which establish special courts to handle gun crimes. Aside
from the fact that the programs are aimed at gun offenders, they
typically have no specifically gun-oriented elements.26
While some interventions involve genuinely gun-oriented elements,
they are combined with non-gun-oriented elements in such a way that
the effects of the different elements cannot be separately assessed.
For example, Boston’s Operation Ceasefire involved two radically
different strategies to reduce youth gun violence, one clearly gun23. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 56–62; Don B. Kates et al.,
Guns and Public Health: Epidemic of Violence or Pandemic of Propaganda?, 62
TENN. L. REV. 513, 513–22 (1995).
24. See Gary Kleck & Shun-Yung Kevin Wang, The Myth of Big-Time Gun
Trafficking and the Overinterpretation of Gun Tracing Data, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1233,
1234–35 (2009).
25. See id.
26. See, e.g., Gun Courts, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION, http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/progtypesguncourt.aspx (last visited Oct. 12,
2012).
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oriented and the other not.27 It not only attempted to disrupt illegal
gun markets and reduce gun trafficking to gang members and other
criminals, but also to reduce youth violence, in the same area, at the
same time, by targeting street gang members with threats of severe
punishment if they continued their violent ways.28 The developers of
the program conceded that they could not convincingly separate the
effects of the gun trafficking disruption efforts from the deterrence
efforts, but nevertheless concluded that the dramatic short-term
reductions in Boston’s youth gun homicide rate were almost certainly
due to the deterrence components rather than the gun trafficking
disruption efforts.29 They based this conclusion mainly on the
grounds that no gun traffickers were convicted until after the youth
gun homicide decreases already had occurred.30 In this light, to
describe Operation Ceasefire as an example of successful gun control,
or even a successful gun intervention, would be misleading at best,
irresponsible at worst.
To include evaluations of programs like these in this Article would
effectively require review of every kind of crime-reduction effort ever
undertaken, as long as its sponsors claimed that at least one of its
goals was to “reduce gun violence.” The reviewer would, for
example, be placed in the absurd situation of reviewing studies of the
impact of capital punishment on homicide merely because some
sponsors of death penalty bills asserted that executions would deter
gun homicides.31 Therefore, this Article covers only specifically gunoriented interventions, whose effects are supposed to be produced
through some restriction on firearms.
A. Lawsuits Against Gun Manufacturers, Distributors, and
Dealers
A variety of non-legislative efforts to reduce gun violence have
been made.32 Beginning in 1989, the Brady Center to Prevent Gun
Violence, the nation’s leading gun control advocacy group, embarked
27. See Anthony A. Braga & Glenn L. Pierce, Disrupting Illegal Firearms
Markets in Boston: The Effects of Operation Ceasefire on the Supply of New
Handguns to Criminals, 4 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 717, 722 (2005).
28. See id. at 723–24.
29. See id. at 743–44.
30. See id. at 723.
31. See Doug Mataconis, There’s No Evidence the Death Penalty Deters Crime,
OUTSIDE BELTWAY (June 12, 2012), http://outsidethebeltway.com/theres-noevidence-the-death-penalty-deters-crime.
32. See, e.g., BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 15.
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on a campaign to organize and assist lawsuits against gun
manufacturers, distributors, and dealers on a variety of legal grounds,
including negligent distribution or marketing, making and selling
defective firearms, deceptive advertising, and contributing to a public
nuisance.33 The Brady Center’s Legal Action Project assisted both
governments and private parties in bringing suits by providing free
legal assistance and expertise to plaintiffs.34 If these cases could be
won on the merits, favorable decisions for plaintiffs might result in
alterations in the way guns are manufactured, distributed, advertised,
and sold.35 In extreme cases, these results could cause the bankruptcy
of the firearms businesses due to damages awarded to plaintiffs or
legal costs.36 Thus, gun availability, in general or among high-risk
persons, might thereby be reduced by trial outcomes favorable to the
plaintiffs. On the other hand, cases that were settled out of court
might benefit individual plaintiffs, but would be unlikely to alter the
way the gun business operated. Certainly cases that were dismissed
or decided against plaintiffs at trial were not likely to produce such
changes.
Few of the lawsuits, however, were won on the merits or resulted in
any changes in the gun industry’s operations. Most cases were
dismissed before reaching trial; in others, the plaintiffs dropped their
claims; and still others resulted in favorable trial decisions for the gun
industry.37 While private plaintiffs occasionally received out-of-court
monetary settlements, these did not require any changes in the way
gun makers, distributors, or retail dealers did business.38
Lawsuits brought by state and municipal governments were
uniformly unsuccessful in obtaining favorable court decisions.39 In

33. See About LAP, BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE,
http://www.bradycenter.org/legalaction/aboutlap (follow “The History of the Legal
Action Project” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
34. See generally id.
35. See Fox Butterfield, Lawsuits Lead Gun Maker to File for Bankruptcy, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/06/24/us/lawsuits-lead-gunmaker-to-file-for-bankruptcy.html. See generally BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN
VIOLENCE, supra note 15.
36. See Butterfield, supra note 35.
37. See generally BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 15.
38. See generally BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 15;
Compendium of State Laws Governing Firearms 2010, NRA-ILA (July 9, 2010),
http://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/articles/2010/compendium-of-state-firearmslaws.aspx.
39. Alan Feuer, U.S. Appeals Court Rejects City’s Suit to Curb Guns, N.Y.
TIMES, May 1, 2008, at B2.
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2008, the New York Times summarized the results of government
lawsuits against gun manufacturers: “Gun makers have been sued
dozens of times by city and state officials across the country, but no
suit has ever been successful.”40 Most of these lawsuits have been
dismissed, while a handful was settled out of court.41 As of 2005, none
of the suits brought by municipal governments had been won by
plaintiffs at trial.42 Since the gun industry rarely has lost lawsuits
brought by either governments or private parties, there is no
affirmative basis to believe that the suits had any impact on gun
availability, and thus no basis to believe that they affected crime or
violence.
In 2005, most lawsuits promoted by the Legal Action Project were
prohibited when the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act
was enacted.43 The law banned civil liability actions from being
brought or continued against manufacturers, distributors, dealers, or
importers of firearms or ammunition for damages resulting from the
misuse of their products by others, unless the actions were permitted
under a set of narrowly defined exceptions.44
B.

Behavioral Interventions to Reduce Firearms Injury

Another broad means of reducing firearms-related injury by
altering gun-related beliefs and practices has been attempted through
“education” or mass media campaigns.45
These interventions
commonly involve educational programs intended to increase
perceptions of gun ownership, handling, and certain gun storage
practices as dangerous, thereby discouraging these behaviors.46 For
example, school-based educational programs aimed at children may
teach them to not touch guns when not supervised by adults.47 In
2004, a panel of the National Research Council reviewed “behavioral
interventions targeted toward reducing firearms injury” and
concluded, “of the more than 80 other programs described at least
briefly in the literature, few have been adequately evaluated as to
40. Id.
41. See generally BRADY CTR. TO PREVENT GUN VIOLENCE, supra note 15.
42. Dan Herbeck, America’s Gun War Is Being Fought in Our Nation’s Courts,
BUFFALO NEWS, June 13, 2005, at A7.
43. See 15 U.S.C. § 7901 (2006).
44. See id.
45. COMM. TO IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. & DATA ON FIREARMS, FIREARMS AND
VIOLENCE: A CRITICAL REVIEW 201 (Charles F. Wellford et al. eds., 2005).
46. See id.
47. See, e.g., id. at 202–05.
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their effectiveness. Those that have been evaluated provide little
empirical evidence that they have a positive impact on children’s
knowledge, attitudes, and beliefs.”48
Another variant of educational efforts aimed primarily at adults
entails physicians counseling patients about the dangers of firearms.49
Although supporters have claimed beneficial impacts of these efforts
in the form of safer gun storage practices or reduced gun ownership
based on crude before-and-after comparisons,50 the only randomized,
controlled trial evaluation of this kind of program found that
counseling had no impact on either gun ownership or gun storage
practices.51 Another type of gun safety educational effort involves the
use of mass communication methods, such as television and radio
announcements, and widespread distribution of printed materials
stressing the dangers of gun ownership or of storing guns in an unsafe
manner.52 The most technically sound evaluation of such a program
found that public education efforts in the form of safe storage
campaigns had no impact on whether guns were stored unlocked or
loaded.53 Finally, gun owners who participated in gun training
programs were found to be no more likely than other gun owners to
store their guns locked and unloaded.54 Whether this reflects the
ineffectiveness of gun training programs is unclear because people
who own guns for defensive purposes are the ones most likely to keep
their guns loaded and unlocked, and most gun training programs
would not instruct owners to store defensive guns locked and
unloaded.55

48. Id. at 213.
49. See, e.g., id. at 202–03.
50. See, e.g., Kara S. McGee et al., Review of Evaluations of Educational
Approaches to Promote Safe Storage of Firearms, 9 INJURY PREVENTION 108, 111
(2003).
51. See David C. Grossman et al., Firearm Safety Counseling in Primary Care
Pediatrics: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 106 PEDIATRICS 22, 24 (2000).
52. See Elanor A. Sidman et al., Evaluation of a Community-Based Handgun
Safe-Storage Campaign, 115 PEDIATRICS 654, 655 (2005).
53. See id. at 658–59.
54. See Douglas S. Weil & David Hemenway, Loaded Guns in the Home:
Analysis of a National Random Survey of Gun Owners, 267 JAMA 3033, 3036
(1992). See generally PHILIP J. COOK & JENS LUDWIG, GUNS IN AMERICA: RESULTS
OF A COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL SURVEY ON FIREARMS OWNERSHIP AND USE 23,
24–25 (1996).
55. See Jens Ludwig, Better Gun Enforcement, Less Crime, 4 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 677, 685 (2005).
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Firearms Safety Technology

The National Research Council Panel on Firearms and Violence
reviewed studies of the impact of firearms safety technology (mostly
locking devices) and stated, “we found no credible scientific
evidence . . . that demonstrates whether safety devices can effectively
lower injury.”56 The Panel noted that many locking devices were
found unreliable in unlocking when an authorized user of the gun
wanted to use the gun,57 and that “firearms safety technology
invariably reduces the effectiveness of the weapon.”58 The Panel also
concluded that locking devices could “cause unintended injuries”
because “locking devices may compromise the ability of authorized
users to defend themselves” and “a lock may fail [to disengage]
entirely or may take too much time for the weapon to be of use.”59
Thus far, attempts to develop reliable “personalized” gun locks that
automatically lock, but then unlock only for authorized users, have
proven unsuccessful.60
V. EFFECTS OF GUN CONTROL LAWS ON CRIME
The primary focus of this review is the effect of gun control laws on
crime. Enacting new gun control laws or amending existing laws to
make them stricter could reduce violent crime by blocking the
acquisition of guns, discouraging their possession in certain
circumstances and locations, or deterring their use in crime.61 The
laws might be broadly aimed at reducing gun availability in the
general population as a whole, or just at subsets of the population
regarded as being at a higher risk of committing violence.62 They can
restrict firearms as a whole, or just narrow subsets like “assault
weapons,” inexpensive concealable handguns, or handguns as a
group.63 Conversely, gun control laws might be loosened, which could
either increase or decrease crime. This Article covers the more
56. See COMM. TO IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. & DATA ON FIREARMS, supra note
45, at 219.
57. Id. at 216.
58. Id. at 217.
59. Id. at 216.
60. COMM. TO IMPROVE RESEARCH INFO. & DATA ON FIREARMS, supra note 45, at
216–17; Gary Kleck, Editorial, Guns Aren’t Ready to Be Smart, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
2000, at A15.
61. See Gary KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 323-58
(1991) [hereinafter KLECK, POINT BLANK] (discussing gun regulations).
62. See id. at 328.
63. For a taxonomy of gun control laws, see id. at 327.
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important types of gun control laws; it does not cover minor types
adopted by only one or two state or local jurisdictions.
A. Bans on Possession of Specific Gun Types

1.

Local Handgun Bans

The United States has never banned the private possession of all
guns or of handguns. Likewise, no state has done so.64 A few
municipalities, however, have banned handguns.65 In recent decades,
the only large cities to do so were Chicago and Washington, D.C.,
which effectively banned the private possession of handguns by first
requiring handguns to be registered, then ceasing to register any more
handguns.66
More precisely, these cities enacted slow-motion
handgun bans in which residents who already had properly registered
handguns could continue possessing them if they re-registered them,
but no further registration of handguns would occur.67 Thus, as lawful
handgun owners died or moved away from the city, the number of
legal handgun owners would dwindle.68 Although these laws were
struck down by the Heller and McDonald decisions, it is still worth
assessing their impacts on crime as a way of judging the likely effects
of adopting similar bans that might prove constitutionally acceptable
to a future Supreme Court.
The technically strongest evaluations of local handgun bans have
assessed the D.C. law.69 Colin Loftin and his colleagues conducted a
time series analysis of homicide trends in D.C. and in the surrounding
suburbs, which were treated as control areas.70 They found that gun
homicides declined abruptly in D.C. immediately after the law went
into effect, and declined to a greater degree than in the D.C. suburbs,
which were not subject to the handgun ban.71 This finding, however,
64. LEE KENNETT & JAMES LAVERNE ANDERSON, THE GUN IN AMERICA:
ORIGINS OF A NATIONAL DILEMMA 244–45 (1975).
65. See Michael B. de Leeuw et al., Ready, Aim, Fire? District of Columbia v.
Heller and Communities of Color, 25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 133, 145–46 (2009).
66. Chester L. Britt et al., A Reassessment of the D.C. Gun Law: Some

Cautionary Notes on the Use of Interrupted Time Series Designs for Policy Impact
Assessment, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 361, 369 (1996).
67. See id. at 369, 371.
68. See id. at 369.
69. D.C. CODE § 6-2301 et seq. (1990).
70. See generally Colin Loftin et al., Effects of Restrictive Licensing of Handguns
on Homicide and Suicide in the District of Columbia, 325 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1615
(1991).
71. See id. at 1678.
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was later found to be extremely fragile—it could not be replicated if
the analysis was improved in any of a number of ways.72 Chester
Britt, Gary Kleck, and David Bordua reanalyzed the D.C. homicide
data and extended the dataset.73 The study found that support for a
homicide-reducing impact disappeared once various improvements
were made in the research.74 For example, the original study’s
statistical model of the temporal pattern of the ban’s effect assumed
an immediate, abrupt effect, even though the law implemented a
slow-motion handgun ban that should have reduced handgun levels
gradually over an extended period of time.75 When an impact model
that more appropriately assumed a gradual impact was used, the
results indicated the law had no effect.76 The authors also used the
D.C. suburbs as a control area, even though control areas are
customarily chosen to resemble the intervention area as closely as
possible.77 The D.C. suburbs are radically different from D.C. When
Baltimore, an area far more similar to D.C. than the suburbs, was
used as a control area, evidence of any impact of the ban on homicide
disappeared.78 Baltimore experienced just as big a drop in gun
homicide as D.C., even though the former did not ban handguns or
otherwise strengthen its gun laws.79 Finally, since the impact of a
slow-motion ban should be most pronounced after a few years have
passed, the time period was extended to cover a longer period of time
after the law was passed in 1976.80 Using this improved study, it was
clear that by 1991 the appearance that the D.C. ban had an impact
had disappeared.81 Thus, the most thorough analysis of the D.C.
handgun ban indicated that it had no effect on homicide rates.82 No
comparable studies of the Chicago handgun ban have been
conducted. In sum, it appears that local handgun bans do not reduce
homicide.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See generally Britt et al., supra note 66.
See generally Britt et al., supra note 66.
See id. at 373–77.
See id. at 369-70.
See id. at 375-76.
See id. at 364-66.
See id. at 373.
See id.
See id. at 375.
See id. at 377.
See generally id.
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Assault Weapon Bans

The 1994 Federal Violent Crime Control Act banned assault
weapons (AWs) and large-capacity ammunition magazines.83 Nine
states have enacted similar bans.84 These assault weapon bans
typically prohibit further manufacture, importation, acquisition, or
transfer of specified models of semiautomatic firearms, while leaving
ownership of existing AWs undisturbed.85 The impact of the laws are
sharply restricted by the narrow scope of prohibited firearms and the
rarity with which these guns are used in crime. For example, the gun
models banned by the federal AW ban claimed less than 1.4% of the
crime guns recovered in two large statewide samples, while AWs in
general account for less than 1.2% of the guns used in homicide and,
on average, only about 1.8% of all the crime guns recovered by police
in forty-three state and local samples.86 Because existing AW bans
did not criminalize possession of AWs already in existence when the
laws were enacted, and unbanned, mechanically identical guns could
easily be substituted for the banned models, the maximum possible
impact of the bans would necessarily be much smaller than 1.2 to
1.8%. For example, it was estimated that even under the most
optimistic plausible set of assumptions, no more than 0.03% of
prospective criminals could have been blocked from getting an AW
or functional equivalent by the federal AW ban.87 We do not have
research methods and data sensitive enough to detect effects this
small. For one thing, statistics on crime, even homicide, are not
accurate to within 2% of the true totals, never mind 0.03%.88
Consequently, claims that the federal AW ban reduced homicides by
7% cannot be taken seriously.89 It is probably impossible to detect

83. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103322, 108 Stat. 1796.
84. See generally BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES,
STATE LAWS AND PUBLISHED ORDINANCES—FIREARMS (2010), available at
http://www.atf.gov/publications/download/platf-p-5300-5-2011/2009-30th-edition.pdf
[hereinafter ATF STATE LAWS]; NRA-ILA, supra note 38.
85. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 1796.
86. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 112–14, 141–43.
87. See Gary Kleck, Impossible Policy Evaluations and Impossible Conclusions:
A Comment on Koper & Roth, 17 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 75, 77 (2001)
[hereinafter Kleck, Comment on Koper & Roth].
88. See id. at 78.
89. See Christopher S. Koper & Jeffrey A. Roth, The Impact of the 1994 Federal

Assault Weapon Ban on Gun Violence Outcomes: An Assessment of Multiple
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the extremely small effects that AW bans might have, if they have any
effect at all.
AWs do not fire significantly more rapidly than other
semiautomatic guns or revolvers, and any one shot from an AW is
not, on average, more lethal than a shot from other, non-AW
firearms.90 Thus, the main reason that AWs might contribute to the
number of deaths and injuries resulting from assaults is that they, like
most semiautomatic firearms, all permit the use of large capacity
magazines (LCMs), which allow a shooter to fire a large number of
rounds without reloading.91 Bans on the further manufacture or sale
of LCMs typically prohibit magazines with a capacity greater than ten
rounds.92 Thus, if denied an LCM, a criminal armed with a
semiautomatic pistol could fire no more than eleven rounds (the ten
stored in the magazine, plus one in the chamber of the gun itself)
without reloading. The bans were based on the premise that some
criminals armed with LCMs would kill or wound more victims
because they could fire more shots without reloading. The impact of
these bans was sharply limited by the fact that very few criminal
assaulters fire more than eleven rounds in a given violent incident
even when they have the ability to do so.93 The firing of so many
rounds is confined to a very small number of usually highly publicized
mass shootings.94 Even in these incidents, however, LCMs are nearly
always irrelevant to the number of rounds fired or the number of
victims killed or wounded because most mass shooters are either
armed with multiple guns and do not need LCMs to fire large
numbers of rounds without reloading or are able to reload their guns
because no victims or other parties tried to interfere with them doing
so.95 In the decade preceding the enactment of the federal AW ban,
there were fifteen mass shooting incidents in which more than six
victims were killed or more than twelve were killed or non-fatally
wounded in the entire United States.96 In all but one of these
incidents, the killer either had multiple guns or reloaded during the
Outcome Measures and Some Lessons for Policy Evaluation, 17 J. QUANTITATIVE
CRIMINOLOGY 33, 59 (2001).
90. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 121–24.
91. See id. at 123–24.
92. See id. at 123.
93. See Koper & Roth, supra note 89, at 40.
94. See Kleck, Comment on Koper & Roth, supra note 87, at 79.
95. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 124–26, 144; Kleck,
Comment on Koper & Roth, supra note 87, at 79.
96. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 124–26, 144.
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incident.97 Thus, even in mass shooting incidents—the type of crime
where the use of LCMs is supposed to be most consequential—LCMs
do not affect the number of persons hurt. Consequently, even an
LCM ban that was so effective that it denied LCMs to all would-be
mass shooters could not have any detectable impact on the number of
victims killed or wounded in mass shootings.

3.

“Saturday Night Special” Bans

These laws ban the possession, or more commonly the manufacture
and sale, of small, inexpensive handguns, popularly known as
“Saturday Night Specials” (SNSs).98 Unlike AWs, these weapons are
a frequently used type of crime gun, and laws that denied access to
SNSs could affect a large number of gun criminals.99 It is not clear,
however, that the effects of doing so would be beneficial. Surveys of
prison inmates indicate that, among those who had committed crimes
with guns before they were sent to prison, the vast majority would
substitute some other type of gun if denied access to SNSs.100 Because
jurisdictions with SNS bans do not ban all handguns or all guns, other
types of guns theoretically still would be available for substitution.101
The problem is that nearly all other common types of firearms are
more lethal than SNSs. Both long guns (rifles and shotguns) and nonSNS handguns are more lethal in the sense that a shot from these
other gun types is more likely to kill the victim than a shot from a
SNS.102 SNSs are generally of smaller caliber and fire smaller
projectiles at a lower muzzle velocity.103 The result is that SNSs inflict
smaller wounds on victims than other gun types.104 As such,
substitution of other gun types would generally increase the fatality
rate arising from gunshot injuries—clearly an undesirable policy
outcome. Simulations of the substitution process, assuming different
rates of substitution and substituted weapons of differing lethality,

97. Kleck, Comment on Koper & Roth, supra note 87, at 79.
98. See Gary Kleck, Evidence that “Saturday Night Specials” Not Very Important
for Crime, 70 SOC. & SOC. RES. 303, 303 (1986) [hereinafter Kleck, Evidence].
99. See id.
100. JAMES D. WRIGHT & PETER H. ROSSI, ARMED AND CONSIDERED
DANGEROUS: A SURVEY OF FELONS AND THEIR FIREARMS 216 (1986).
101. See generally ATF STATE LAWS, supra note 84.
102. See Gary Kleck, Handgun-Only Gun Control, in FIREARMS AND VIOLENCE:
ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY 177-85 (Don B. Kates, Jr. ed., 1984) [hereinafter Kleck,
Handgun-Only].
103. See Kleck, Evidence, supra note 98, at 306.
104. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 134.
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indicate that with even modest levels of substitution, SNS bans and
handgun bans in general are likely to produce a net increase in
homicides.105
Empirical research, however, indicates that SNS bans neither
reduce nor increase homicide.106 This may indicate that the bans did
not deny SNSs to any significant number of prospective killers and
the need for offenders to seek substitute weapons does not arise.
Kleck and Patterson found no effect of SNS bans on rates of
homicide, rape, aggravated assault, or robbery in America’s 170
largest cities, controlling for other gun laws and a variety of other
control variables.107
B.

Bans on Acquisition or Possession of Guns by High-Risk
Subsets of the Population

It is common for the states to prohibit the acquisition or possession
of guns by relatively narrow “high-risk” subsets of the population.
The categories of persons most commonly targeted are convicted
criminals (often just those convicted of felonies), mentally ill persons,
alcoholics (and persons under the influence of alcohol at the time of
an attempt to acquire a gun), drug addicts (and persons under the
influence at the time of an attempt to acquire a gun), and minors
(usually defined as persons under the age of either twenty-one or
eighteen).108 Other bans apply to persons of temporary statuses, such
as a fugitive from justice or one subject to a restraining order
protecting an intimate partner.109
The most comprehensive assessment of these bans simultaneously
assessed the effects of bans on gun possession by criminals, mentally
ill persons, drug addicts, alcoholics, and minors, with respect to rates
of homicide, aggravated assault, robbery, and rape.110 Kleck and
Patterson found no significant crime-reducing effects resulting from
any of these five types of bans on any of the four types of violent
crime, with the possible exceptions of bans on gun possession by

105. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 91–94, 97. See generally Kleck,
Hangun-Only, supra note 102.
106. See Kleck, Evidence, supra note 98, at 305–06.
107. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 274.
108. See ATF STATE LAWS, supra note 84; see also NRA-ILA, supra note 38.
109. See sources cited supra note 108.
110. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 274.
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criminals on aggravated assault and robbery and a likely effect of
bans on gun possession by mentally ill persons on homicide.111
A recent study carefully assessed the impact on intimate partner
homicides of five different types of domestic violence gun laws:
restraining order laws forbidding purchase or possession of guns,
restraining order laws forbidding possession only, laws forbidding
purchase or possession of guns by persons convicted of domestic
violence misdemeanors, laws forbidding only possession of guns by
persons convicted of domestic violence misdemeanors, and laws
permitting law enforcement officers to confiscate firearms at the
scene of an alleged domestic violence incident.112 Of these five types
of gun laws, only restraining order laws forbidding purchase or
possession of guns showed evidence of impacting the number of
intimate partner homicides.113
C.

Background Checks of Prospective Gun Buyers

1.

The Brady Act

The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (the Brady Act),
which became effective on February 28, 1994, is the most significant
piece of federal firearms control legislation passed since the Gun
Control Act of 1968.114 The law’s central gun control mechanism is an
instant background check on persons seeking to purchase guns of any
kind, not just handguns, from Federal Firearms License holders
(FFLs).115 It required FFLs to check with law enforcement authorities
to see if the prospective buyer was disqualified under federal law
from buying a gun, particularly if the buyer had previously been
convicted of a felony.116 The law exempted the eighteen states that
already had their own gun purchase background checks in place
before 1994, and thus introduced new background checks into the

111. See id.
112. See Elizabeth Richardson Vigdor & James A. Mercy, Do Laws Restricting

Access to Firearms by Domestic Violence Offenders Prevent Intimate Partner
Homicide?, 30 EVALUATION REV. 313, 330 (2006).
113. See id.
114. Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159, 107 Stat. 1536
(1993) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-22 (2006); see also JEFFREY D.
MONROE, HOMICIDE AND GUN CONTROL: THE BRADY HANDGUN VIOLENCE
PREVENTION ACT AND HOMICIDE RATES 1 (2008).
115. See 18 U.S.C. § 922.
116. See id. § 922(t).
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remaining thirty-two states.117
It did not, however, impose
background checks on prospective gun buyers seeking guns from
private sources.118
Jens Ludwig and Philip Cook evaluated the Brady Law and
concluded that its implementation was not associated with a
reduction in adult homicides.119 Gary Kleck and Thomas Marvell
criticized the research for studying an unduly short period of time,
1990–1997, which limited the ability to model pre-law trends or to
detect anything but the very immediate effects of the law.120 They
noted that, because the law restricted new acquisitions of guns but did
not immediately disarm anyone, the law’s effect should be slight in
the short run even if it was strong in the long run, when more wouldbe criminal gun buyers were denied guns.121 The analysis was simply
done too soon to assess the law’s impact properly, and it remains to
be seen whether the Brady Law was effective. The evaluation also
failed to adequately control for confounding variables and wrongly
assumed that the Brady Act could only affect killings of adults.122
This assumption was based on the fact that the law did not change the
legal status of gun purchases by minors (they were forbidden both
before and after the Brady Act). The assumption is wrong because
roughly half of killings of juveniles are by adults, meaning that the
implementation of the Brady Act’s new restrictions on adult
acquisition of guns could have affected the number of killings of
juveniles.123
A second assessment also concluded that the Brady Law did not
affect homicide rates.124 This study used different methods, but
shared the most serious flaws of its predecessor—far too short a postlaw evaluation period (just three years) and inadequate controls for

117. See id. § 922(t)(3)(A).
118. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GUN CONTROL: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
BRADY HANDGUN VIOLENCE PREVENTION ACT 20 (1996).
119. Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, Homicide and Suicide Rates Associated with
Implementation of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 284 JAMA 585, 588
(2000).
120. See Gary Kleck & Thomas Marvell, Letter to the Editor, Impact of the Brady
Act on Homicide and Suicide Rates, 284 JAMA 2718, 2718 (2000).
121. See id. at 2719.
122. See id. at 2718.
123. See id.
124. See MONROE, supra note 114, at 3.
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confounding variables.125 Consequently, there is no sound foundation
for judging whether the Brady Act was effective. Firm conclusions
will have to await research studying a longer post-1994 period and
explicitly controlling for a significant number of other factors that
affect homicide rates.

2.

State-Mandated Background Checks

Before the Brady Act was implemented, many states had laws
requiring background checks before gun sales, and some of those
state laws still in effect are stricter than the federal law in some
respects. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider the effects of these statelevel measures. Background checks or screening for disqualifying
characteristics of prospective gun buyers are usually conducted in
connection with gun owner licensing, purchase permit, or purchase
application systems; therefore, one may gain insight into the impact of
background checks by examining the impact of these kinds of laws.
Kleck and Patterson found that gun owner licensing laws and
purchase permit laws may reduce homicide, but do not affect rates of
rape, robbery, or aggravated assault.126 These results suggest that
background checks have value for preventing murders with guns.
The apparent conflict between these findings concerning state-level
background checks and Ludwig and Cook’s findings regarding the
Brady Act,127 whose main gun control element was background
screening of prospective gun buyers, may be attributable to a
difference in the kinds of effects measured. Kleck and Patterson
assessed the long-term effects of state laws requiring background
checks,128 while Ludwig and Cook could detect only the very shortterm effects of the Brady Act, which were unlikely to be significant.
D. Gun Registration
Gun registration is sometimes confused with other legal measures
that commonly accompany it, such as licensing of gun owners, permits
to purchase guns, or screening of prospective gun buyers for criminal
records or other disqualifying traits. Registration of guns, however,
involves nothing more than officially recording the acquisition or
125. See Gary Kleck, Book Review, 35 CRIM. JUST. REV. 118, 118-19 (2010)
(reviewing JEFFREY D. MONROE, HOMICIDE AND GUN CONTROL: THE BRADY
HANDGUN VIOLENCE PREVENTION ACT AND HOMICIDE RATES (2008)).
126. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 274.
127. See Ludwig & Cook, supra note 119.
128. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 256.
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ownership of firearms.129 It is precisely analogous to the registration
of motor vehicles, which entails recording the owners of the vehicles
but is not intended to block anyone from owning or driving a vehicle.
Likewise, registration of firearms, as distinct from licensing gun
owners or screening prospective gun buyers, merely involves
generating a written record of the person who acquired or owns a
gun, without blocking anyone from acquiring or owning a gun.130
Most state gun registration laws require a record of handgun
purchases be provided to some governmental agency, rather than
requiring registration of all handgun owners.131
The most common rationales that advocates offer for expecting
some crime-reducing impact of gun registration are either that (1)
registration will aid authorities in tracing the prior history of guns
used in crimes and thereby help in eventually identifying gun
traffickers and other unlawful sellers of guns, or (2) registration will
deter criminal use of guns because prospective offenders will believe
they could be identified through registration records.132 The latter
rationale founders on the fact that criminals almost never use guns
that are registered in their own names and rarely leave their guns
behind at the scene of a violent crime for police to recover.133
Therefore, advocates of gun registration more commonly stress the
value of registration for aiding in the identification of criminal gun
suppliers.
The trafficking-focused rationale, however, hinges on an
underlying theory of how criminals acquire guns, which emphasizes
the significance of organized, high-volume gun traffickers.134 If such
illicit dealers account for significant numbers of criminals acquiring
guns, then any techniques that would facilitate identifying these
traffickers could have substantial potential for reducing the number
of criminals who become armed with guns, thereby reducing gun
violence. Some scholars have claimed support for this “concentrated
trafficking model,” but the support largely relies on the
misinterpretation of ATF gun tracing data and what it supposedly
indicates about the involvement of “point sources” of illegal guns, i.e.

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 335–37.
See id.
See generally ATF STATE LAWS, supra note 84.
PETE SHIELDS, GUNS DON’T DIE—PEOPLE DO 150 (1981).
See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 335–36.
See Kleck & Wang, supra note 24, at 1239–40.
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higher-volume traffickers.135 The best available evidence indicates
that high-volume traffickers are virtually non-existent and contribute
only a negligible share of guns obtained by criminals.136 More
commonly, the persons who illegally sell guns are residential burglars
who sell the handful of guns they steal each year.137 Arresting and
convicting such low-volume and easily replaceable sellers likely has
little effect on the flow of guns to criminals.138 Therefore, using
registration systems to identify largely non-existent high-volume gun
traffickers or real but low-volume traffickers is largely irrelevant to
the reduction of crime.
E.

One-Gun-a-Month Laws

One other type of gun control law similarly relies on the
concentrated gun trafficking model for its crime-reducing rationale.
Based on ambiguous gun tracing data and law enforcement anecdotes
about apprehended traffickers, gun control advocates and some
scholars have claimed that a significant share of crime guns are
diverted to criminals by traffickers who buy large numbers of guns
(usually handguns) from licensed retail gun dealers.139 They are
purchased either directly or, alternatively, indirectly through the use
of straw purchasers (confederates of the trafficker who pose as
genuine purchasers but actually buy guns on behalf of the
trafficker).140 Supporters of this theory assert that many licensed
dealers who sell the guns do so either knowing the transactions are
suspicious or do so negligently, not caring whether the buyer might be
a trafficker or straw purchaser.141 Thus, purchases of large numbers of
handguns at a time from a corrupt or negligent licensed dealer are
regarded as key mechanisms by which guns are diverted from legal
channels to criminals. Therefore, gun control advocates have pushed
the enactment of laws that forbid selling more than one handgun to a
given individual within a month on the assumption that this would
significantly impair the efforts of traffickers to quickly acquire the
large numbers of handguns they supposedly sell.

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

See id.
See id. at 1241.
See WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 100, at 197-99.
See Kleck & Wang, supra note 24, at 1238.
See, e.g., Philip J. Cook et al., Regulating Gun Markets, 86 J. CRIM. L. &

CRIMINOLOGY 59, 76–79 (1995).
140. See id. at 79
141. See id. at 78.
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As noted before, traffickers who sell large numbers of guns are
extremely rare and do not contribute significantly to the flow of guns
into criminals’ hands.142 For this reason alone, it is unlikely that onegun laws could reduce gun violence by any measurable degree. It also
turns out that most handguns purchased in “bunches”—i.e., as a part
of a multiple handgun purchase (MHP)—are rarely later recovered
by police in connection with crimes, and are actually less likely to be
linked with later crimes than handguns purchased one at a time.143
Koper used ATF gun trace data to identify handguns purchased as
part of an MHP and to compute the share of the guns later recovered
by police in connection with crimes.144 He found that even after ten
years, only 4.07% of MHP handguns had been linked with crimes,
and that this share was actually slightly lower than the 4.69% of nonMHP handguns that were linked with crimes.145 As far as the
available evidence can inform us, handguns purchased in multiples
are rarely purchased by traffickers or straw purchasers, given that few
crime guns are supplied by traffickers, and few MHP handguns ever
end up being used in crimes.146 As a result, there is no sound
empirical basis for the rationale that underlies one-gun laws. The
laws probably do no harm beyond inconveniencing the occasional
lawful handgun buyer, but are also unlikely to have any measurable
impact on crime rates. This expectation was confirmed by a
sophisticated, state-level, fixed-effects panel study of crime rates by
John Lott and John Whitley,147 who controlled for other gun control
laws and forty specific control variables,148 and found no significant
crime-reducing effect from one-gun laws on any of the seven FBI
Index crime rates.149

142. See Kleck & Wang, supra note 24, at 1241.
143. See Christopher S. Koper, Purchase of Multiple Firearms as a Risk Factor for
Criminal Gun Use: Implications for Gun Policy and Enforcement, 4 CRIMINOLOGY &
PUB. POL’Y 749, 760 (2005).
144. See id.
145. See id. at 760–61.
146. See id. at 762.
147. See generally John R. Lott, Jr. & John E. Whitley, Safe-Storage Gun Laws:
Accidental Deaths, Suicides, and Crime, 44 J.L. & ECON 659 (2001).
148. See id. at 679–80.
149. See id. at 680.
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Waiting Periods

Some gun control laws try to delay gun acquisitions rather than
blocking them altogether.150 Some require that gun buyers who paid
for the gun and passed any required screening for disqualifying
attributes wait a given minimum period of time before actually taking
delivery of the gun.151 The waiting periods are usually two or three
days, but can be as long as fourteen days in some states.152 Two
rationales have been offered for waiting periods. First, it was once
argued that they served as “cooling off” periods, allowing prospective
buyers in the grip of a violent fury to calm down before acquiring a
gun.153 The plausibility of this rationale is undercut by the fact that
criminal aggressors rarely acquire guns shortly before committing a
violent act with the gun.154 Even where no waiting periods are in
operation, violent offenders usually had their guns long before they
used them to commit a violent crime.155 Further, among the violent
gun offenders who get guns at the last minute, few acquire them from
the licensed dealers who would observe the legally mandated waiting
period.156 Another rationale for waiting periods is that they allow
more time to carry out more thorough background checks.157 This
makes little sense with regard to computerized record checks, since
they can be carried out in minutes, but it is conceivable that states
that still consult paper records might make use of this additional time.
There is, however, no empirical evidence that more thorough, timeconsuming record checks are carried out in states with waiting
periods. Not surprisingly, empirical evaluations consistently indicate
that waiting periods have no measurable effect on violent crime
rates.158

150. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 323–32.
151. See ATF STATE LAWS, supra note 84, at 12–13.
152. See id.
153. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 333–34 (noting that only three of
342 incarcerated handgun killers in Florida had purchased the murder weapon from a
retail dealer within three days of the killing).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id. at 334–35.
157. See id.
158. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 283; Colin Loftin &
David McDowall, The Deterrent Effects of the Florida Felony Firearm Law, 75 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 250, 255 (1984); Lott & Whitley, supra note 147, at 679.
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G. Enhanced Penalties for Crimes Committed with Guns
Some gun-oriented interventions do not involve restricting access
to guns, but rather, attempt to discourage their use in crimes by
establishing more severe punishment if offenses are committed with a
gun.159 Firearms sentence enhancement (FSE) laws establish either
mandatory minimum prison sentences for crimes committed with a
gun or add on additional penalties for the gun use, above and beyond
the penalties for the underlying offense, such as robbery or
aggravated assault.160 The authors of a few technically primitive
studies of a small number of non-randomly selected local areas have
claimed to find an impact of FSE laws on crime,161 but the best
available evidence indicates that they have no impact.162 The most
comprehensive and sophisticated study was done by Thomas Marvell
and Carlisle Moody, who analyzed every single state FSE measure in
existence at the time of their research, using a multivariate fixedeffects panel design to determine whether crime rates declined after
FSE laws were implemented.163 They concluded that there is little
evidence that the laws generally reduce crime.164 Indeed, they found
that when crime rates changed significantly after implementation of
FSE laws, they were slightly more likely to increase than to
decrease.165 These findings confirmed the city-level cross-sectional
findings of Kleck and Patterson,166 and more limited time series
analyses of mandatory penalty laws in Michigan and Florida.167

159. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 337–42. See generally Thomas B.
Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Impact of Enhanced Prison Terms for Felonies
Committed With Guns, 33 CRIMINOLOGY 247 (1995).
160. See Marvell & Moody, supra note 159, at 250.
161. See, e.g., David McDowall et al., A Comparative Study of the Preventive
Effects of Mandatory Sentencing Laws for Gun Crimes, 83 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 378 (1992).
162. See generally Marvell & Moody, supra note 159.
163. See generally id.
164. See generally id.
165. See generally id.
166. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 274.
167. See generally Colin Loftin et al., Mandatory Sentencing and Firearms
Violence: Evaluating an Alternative to Gun Control, 17.2 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 287
(1983); Loftin & McDowall, supra note 158.
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H. Child-Access Protection Laws: Requiring Guns to Be Stored
Secured
Child-Access Protection (CAP) laws require that gun owners keep
their guns secured so that young persons (most commonly defined as
those under fifteen or sixteen years of age) may not gain access to
them and provide criminal penalties if harm is done by a young
person with an unsecured gun.168 The laws are primarily aimed at
reducing gun accidents, though they might also reduce other kinds of
gun violence. The most thorough and comprehensive study of the
impact of CAP laws on gun accidents among young people was that
of Daniel Webster and Marc Starnes, who assessed all fifteen CAP
laws existing at the time169 using a state-level panel design that
compared trends in fatal gun accidents in states that passed CAP laws
with trends in states that did not.170 They found no significant effect
of the laws in fourteen of the fifteen states; the only state that
experienced a significant decline was Florida, the first state to pass a
CAP law.171
The authors interpreted this one decline as a genuine effect of the
Florida CAP law, even though none of the fourteen other states with
CAP laws experienced such an effect.172 They attributed this unique
Florida effect to the fact that the law in that state provided for felony
penalties for violations.173 This explanation founders for two reasons:
first, the authors provided no evidence that felony penalties have ever
actually been imposed for CAP law violations in Florida, and second,
two other states’ CAP laws also provided felony penalties but did not
experience declines in gun accidents among young people.174 A more
plausible explanation of the Florida experience is that the effects
were actually due to the extraordinary volume of news media
coverage of the unique cluster of gun accidents that preceded and
provoked passage of Florida’s CAP law, as well as the debate over

168. See generally Lott & Whitley, supra note 147; Daniel W. Webster & Marc
Starnes, Reexamining the Association Between Child Access Prevention Gun Laws
and Unintentional Shooting Deaths of Children, 106 PEDIATRICS 1466 (2000).
169. Only two more were subsequently enacted. See ATF STATE LAWS, supra note
84; see also NRA State Laws, supra note 38; Right-to-Carry, infra note 180.
170. See generally Webster & Starnes, supra note 168.
171. See id. at 1467–68.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
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the law and the underlying issue of unsafe storage of guns.175 This
intense burst of publicity served to highlight the dangers of unsafe
gun storage and may have stimulated more gun owners to lock up
their firearms, independent of the passage of the CAP law itself.
Unfortunately, states that later followed Florida’s example could not
expect to enjoy the same massive volume of news coverage that the
first-in-the-nation CAP law received, so this publicity effect is not
likely to be repeated. CAP laws themselves appear to have no
significant effect on gun accidents among young people.
On the other hand, there is some evidence that CAP laws, by
making guns harder to acquire immediately for defensive use by
crime victims, increase crime rates. Lott and Whitley found that the
implementation of CAP laws was followed by significant increases in
rates of rape, robbery, and burglary, with no compensating reductions
in gun accident or suicide rates.176 This study, however, was subject to
some of the same problems characterizing most of the panel studies
that evaluated RTC laws, including the use of an unjustified, arbitrary
selection of control variables, and no direct evidence of either
changes among prospective offenders in perceived risk of confronting
armed crime victims or of actual reductions in the accessibility of
firearms.177
I.

Restrictions on Carrying Guns Away From Home

Some gun laws restrict possession of firearms away from the
possessor’s home, either prohibiting it altogether or requiring a
special permit.178 Restrictions tend to be stricter when carrying guns
on the person than when carrying in one’s vehicle and stricter for
concealed carrying than for open carrying.179 The strictness levels
used to be far more variable across states than they are now, since the
post-1986 wave of “shall-issue” or “right-to-carry” laws were
passed.180 Now at least forty states have these more lenient carry
laws, which require a carry permit but allow most noncriminal adult
175. For a discussion of the limited effects of CAP laws, see Emmet Meara, Bill
Before Legislature May Be Affected by Rampage, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Apr. 22,
1999, at A4.
176. See Lott & Whitley, supra note 147, at 679, 685.
177. See infra Part V.J.
178. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 326–27.
179. See id.
180. See Right-to-Carry 2012, NRA-ILA, http://www.nraila.org/news-issues/factsheets/2012/right-to-carry-2012.aspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) [hereinafter NRA-ILA,
Right-to-Carry].
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residents to get one.181 A few states do not even require a permit
(e.g., Arizona and Vermont), while other states require a permit that
is rarely granted (restrictive licensing, e.g. California and New York),
and Illinois forbids carrying altogether.182
Cross-sectional research comparing cities in states with differing
gun carrying laws found that banning carrying or having a restrictive
permit law on concealed carrying, compared with those with
permissive carry permit requirements or no permit requirement at all,
had no effect on any violent crime rate, and that similar laws
concerning open carrying likewise showed no measurable effect.183
Longitudinal research, examining changes in crime after new carry
laws were passed, could not be effectively applied in the pre-1986
period because there were so few changes in the strictness of legal
controls over carrying.184 Most states had restrictive carry laws
throughout the 1968-1985 period.185 The opportunity to detect the
impact of changes over time in carry law strictness arose after 1986,
when stricter carry laws began to give way to permissive licensing or
“shall issue” carry laws.186 Research on these changes is covered in
the next section.
J.

Gun Decontrol: Right-to-Carry Laws

Right-to-Carry (RTC) laws, also known as “shall issue” laws, can
be seen as a form of gun decontrol in which controls over the carrying
of firearms away from the carrier’s property are more lenient. They
typically involve changing state carry permit laws from discretionary
“may issue” laws (restrictive licensing laws) to non-discretionary
“shall issue” laws.187 Under the old discretionary carry permit
systems, the burden of proof was on the applicant to show a special
need or other special qualifications to have the permit, and the
authority making this decision (often a county sheriff) had virtually

181.
182.
180.
183.
184.
185.

See id.
See NRA-ILA, supra note 38; see also NRA-ILA, Right-to-Carry, supra note

See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 274.
See id. at 252.
See generally Tomislav V. Kovandzic et al., The Impact of “Shall-Issue”
Concealed Handgun Laws on Violent Crime Rates: Evidence from Panel Data for
Large Urban Cities, 9 HOMICIDE STUD. 292 (2005); Marvell & Moody, supra note

159.
186. See sources cited supra note 185.
187. See Kovandzic et al., supra note 185, at 292–93.
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unlimited discretion in deciding whether to grant the permit.188
Applicants without disqualifying attributes, such as a criminal
conviction or being a juvenile, could nevertheless be turned down—
the authorized decision-maker “may” issue the permit, but is not
required to do so.189 Permits were rarely issued.190 Under “shall
issue” or RTC laws, authorities are required to grant the permit to
applicants who meet specified requirements (e.g., adult age, resident
of the state, no criminal convictions, completed gun safety course),
and do not have the discretion of denying permits to otherwise
qualified applicants.191
By 2008, there were more than two dozen empirical evaluations of
the effect of RTC laws on crime rates. The results are about evenly
divided between those that found crime-reducing effects and those
that found no net effect.192 Only two studies have found crimeincreasing effects, neither published in a refereed journal, while ten
refereed studies found crime-reducing effects and nine found no
effect one way or the other.193 This simple count, however, does not
tell the full story because nearly all of the studies finding crimereducing effects were based on county-level crime counts known to
the police that were subject to serious missing-data problems.194 Most
analysts used panel designs to examine trends in crime before and
after RTC laws were enacted, as well as compared crime trends of
counties in states that implemented RTC laws with counties in states
that did not.195 Data from the Uniform Crime Reporting program are
missing for at least some time periods for most American law
enforcement agencies within the span of years examined in these
studies, and most of the studies did nothing to account for this missing
data.196 Thus, the data may seem to indicate that crime went down in
a given county when the “decrease” was actually due to the fact that
some of the constituent local jurisdictions in that county did not

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

See id.
See id.
See id. at 316.
See id. at 292.
See id. at 311–15.
See Marvell & Moody, supra note 159, at 275–76.
Michael D. Maltz & Joseph Targonski, A Note on the Use of County-Level
UCR Data, 18 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 297, 297–98 (2002).
195. See id.
196. See id. at 316–17.
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report their crime statistics to the UCR for part or all of that year—
especially if the non-reporting agencies were in high-crime areas.197
This would not be a problem if non-reporting was unrelated to the
passage of RTC laws, but it is possible that non-reporting is especially
likely in RTC states immediately after enactment of the laws due to
the avalanche of carry permit applications that are submitted in this
period. Local law enforcement agencies must perform fingerprinting
of applicants, and this considerable drain on manpower may force
undermanned agencies to sacrifice some lower-priority tasks, such as
compiling crime statistics for the UCR program.198 The result would
be the artificial appearance of crime drops occurring just after
enactment of RTC laws and occurring only in RTC states—precisely
the pattern of crime trends that has been interpreted as evidence of
the crime-reducing effects of RTC laws.199
The only high-quality study that is completely free of this missing
data problem is the city-level panel study of Tomislav Kovandzic,
Thomas Marvell, and Lynne Vieraitis.200 These authors studied the
relevant crime data for each city that could be obtained from a single
municipal police force for each year, and they studied only cities with
complete data for all the years studied.201 Consequently, they did not
have the missing-data problem of other studies that resulted from
counting crimes for counties by summing crime counts for individual
constituent law enforcement agencies in each county. This study also
featured an unusually well-chosen set of specific control variables to
help separate the effect of RTC laws from other factors that influence
crime rates,202 addressed possible problems of simultaneity (two-way
causation),203 took account of clustering of multiple cities in states,204
and used very sophisticated statistical estimation procedures.205 Based
on their fixed-effects panel analysis of 189 U.S. cities with populations
of 100,000 or larger over the period 1980–2000, the authors found “no

197. See id. at 299.
198. For an example of how extensive a gun permit application can be, see supra
note 5.
199. See, e.g., John R. Lott, Jr. & David B. Mustard, Crime, Deterrence, and
Right-to-Carry Concealed Handguns (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 41, 1997).
200. See Kovandzic et al., supra note 185.
201. See id. at 301–02.
202. See id. at 305–07.
203. See id. at 300–01.
204. See id. at 302.
205. See id. at 303–04.
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evidence that the laws reduce or increase rates of violent crime.”206
This study also provides interested readers with a compact summary
of the wide array of other methodological problems that afflict studies
of the impact of RTC laws.207
It is not surprising that research finds that liberalized issuance of
carry permits does not have any measurable crime-increasing effect,
given that carry permit holders virtually never commit violent gun
crimes or do so in places that require carrying the gun on the person
through public spaces.208 On the other hand, it is not especially
surprising that the best available evidence indicates that RTC laws do
not reduce crime.209 Supporters of the idea that such an effect occurs
assume that the laws reduce crime because prospective criminal
offenders are deterred by a greater perception of risk of confronting
an armed victim, which supposedly results from either the enactment
of RTC laws or the issuance of large numbers of carry permits to
potential crime victims.210 There is, however, no direct evidence at all
of changes in the perceived risk of confronting armed victims among
likely offenders following enactment of RTC laws. Further, the
expectation of such changes is based on the assumption that the
overall frequency of gun carrying by prospective crime victims
actually increases when RTC laws go into effect. Certainly the
number of legally authorized gun carriers, i.e., carry permit holders,
goes up, but whether the total number of gun-carriers, lawful or
unlawful, increases is another matter entirely. It is the latter number
that is relevant to the risk of offenders confronting gun-carrying
victims. Those who get carry permits following implementation of an
RTC may be merely legitimating gun carrying they were already
doing before getting the permit.
As it happens, the only direct evidence we have on this matter
indicates that this is indeed what most carry permit holders are doing
when they get their permits because, as a group, they generally do not
increase their frequency of carrying after they get the permit.211 The
National Opinion Research Center’s 2001 National Gun Policy
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 292.
See id. at 298–302.
See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 369–70.
See Kovandzic et al., supra note 185, at 292.
See generally Lott & Mustard, supra note 199.
See 2001 National Gun Policy Survey, May, 2001, ROPER CTR.

FOR PUB.
OPINION RES., http://www.ropercenter.uconn.edu/data_access/ipoll/ipoll.html (type
into the search bar: “since you’ve obtained the permit”; then search by “Exact
Phrase”) (last visited Oct. 12, 2012).
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Survey, conducted in May of 2001, asked a sample of self-reported
carry permit holders this question: “Since you’ve obtained the permit
(to carry a handgun), has your frequency of gun carrying increased,
decreased, or stayed the same?”212 Among carry permit holders, 73%
did not change their frequency of gun carrying after getting the
permit, and there was no significant difference between the percent
that reported increasing their carrying frequency and the percent that
reported decreasing their carry frequency.213 Consequently, there is
no support for the assumption that total frequency of gun carrying
increased or that prospective offenders faced an increased likelihood
of confronting a gun-carrying victim following passage of RTC laws.
Because there is no reason for offenders to perceive any increased
risk of committing crime, it is not surprising that RTC laws do not
appear to deter criminal attempts. Note that this does not mean that
gun carrying by prospective crime victims has no deterrent effect on
prospective offenders; rather, it only means that whatever deterrent
effect it may have had probably did not increase after RTC laws were
implemented.
K. Increased Enforcement of Carry Laws
Increasing efforts to enforce existing laws, rather than enacting
new ones, might intensify the impact of gun control on crime. In
principle, the enforcement of any gun control law could be increased,
but research on the effects of boosting enforcement is largely limited
to carry laws because these are the only types of gun laws that police
actively enforce to any significant degree.214 Enforcement in this
context means police arresting violators.
There have been a few assessments of the impact of “directed (or
targeted) patrol” by the police. These efforts involve increased
numbers of police officers being assigned to a patrol area, who are
directed to focus their efforts on detecting and seizing illegal guns.215
Few guns are actually seized, however, and virtually all of these are
seized in connection with arrests for unlawful possession, which in
212. Id.
213. Id. See also TOM W. SMITH, 2001 NATIONAL GUN POLICY SURVEY OF THE
NATIONAL OPINION RESEARCH CENTER: RESEARCH FINDINGS 15 (2001), available at
http://www.norc.org/PDFs/publications/SmithT_Nat_Gun_Policy_2001.pdf.
214. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 347–53.
215. See generally Edmund F. McGarrell et al., Reducing Firearms Violence
Through Directed Police Patrol, 1 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 119 (2001); Lawrence
W. Sherman & Dennis P. Rogan, Effects of Gun Seizures on Gun Violence: “Hot
Spots” Patrol in Kansas City, 12 JUST. Q. 673 (1995).
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turn are mostly made in the public places where police patrol.216
Thus, the studies really amount to assessments of increased police
enforcement of carry laws.
Although these programs are declared by their sponsors to be
aimed at reducing gun violence,217 their primary element is simply a
general increase in police manpower presence in targeted patrol
areas.218 Evaluations of such efforts invariably fail to separate the
effects of gun-oriented elements, such as seizing guns from suspects,
from the effects of simply increasing the number of police officers
patrolling in target areas. For example, Lawrence Sherman and
Dennis Rogan claimed that a “hot spots” intervention had reduced
gun violence by police officers seizing illegal guns, but offered no
evidence that this gun-related element was responsible for local
deceases in gun violence rather than it resulting from increased
overall police manpower.219 The researchers observed a 49%
decrease in gun crimes in the targeted area.220 The explanation the
authors offered for this huge drop is especially dubious in light of the
fact that the investment of 4,512 additional police man-hours in
directed patrol yielded a grand total of just twenty-nine seized guns in
a large Kansas City neighborhood over a six month period.221
Another directed patrol effort in Indianapolis had even more
tenuous connections with gun enforcement because it consisted of
patrol officers focusing primarily on traffic enforcement, and making
more traffic stops. As a by-product of the vehicle stops, however,
officers seized twenty-five illegal guns for an investment of 4,900
officer hours.222 Associated arrests for unlawful gun possession
amounted to enforcement of gun carry laws. The results of this
program were considerably more mixed than those of the Kansas City
program. The number of gun crimes went down by 29% in one of the
intervention areas but actually increased by 36% in the other
intervention area (compared with an 8% increase in comparison
beats).223

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See sources cited supra note 215.
See Sherman & Rogan, supra note 215, at 676–77.
See McGarrell et al., supra note 215, at 123–24.
See Sherman & Rogan, supra note 215, at 690–91.
See id. at 673.
See id. at 680.
See McGarrell, supra note 215, at 131.
See id. at 137.
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Pittsburgh’s Firearm Suppression Patrol (FSP) program was
specifically directed at reducing illegal gun carrying, and consisted of
more patrol being assigned to targeted areas, and increased traffic
and pedestrian stops.224 Jacqueline Cohen and Jens Ludwig did not
have measures of gun carrying per se, but instead evaluated the
program’s impact on reports of shots fired and gunshot injuries
treated in hospitals.225 Only seven guns were confiscated and only
three persons possessing guns were arrested during FSPs,226 so it is
debatable how much this program can be regarded as gun law
enforcement. For what it’s worth, the authors observed greater
reductions in shots fired and gunshot injuries in target areas than in
control areas.227 As with the evaluations of other directed patrol
efforts, it is impossible to tell whether these reductions were due to
any specifically gun-related efforts of police, or merely to increased
police activity in general.
Project Exile in Richmond, Virginia involved increased
enforcement in another sense—more prosecutions of gun offenders
and more severe sentences imposed on them (achieved by
prosecuting under harsher federal statutes than under state
statutes).228 Proponents claimed that the effort produced huge
decreases in gun homicides, pointing to a 40% decline from 1997 to
1998,229 but the most thorough analysis found that Richmond would
have experienced an even larger proportional decrease in gun
homicides if Project Exile had not been implemented.230
On the whole, the weak body of evidence on enforcement of gun
laws does not provide a firm basis for drawing conclusions about their
impact. On the other hand, the research does not indicate that
increased enforcement has no effect, so this strategy remains a viable
option for reducing gun violence. And unlike so many other gun
control measures, it has broad political support, so there are realistic
prospects for the strategy to actually be implemented.
224. Jacqueline Cohen & Jens Ludwig, Policing Crime Guns, in EVALUATING GUN
POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 217, 220 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook
eds., 2003).
225. See id. at 223.
226. See id. at 224.
227. See id. at 230–31.
228. Steven Raphael & Jens Ludwig, Prison Sentence Enhancements: The Case of
Project Exile, in EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND VIOLENCE 251,
254 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook eds., 2003).
229. Michael Janofsky, Fighting Crime by Making Federal Case About Guns, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 10, 1999, at A12.
230. See Raphael & Ludwig, supra note 228, at 267.
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CONCLUSION: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE
Even though gun ownership levels in the general public have no
apparent net effect on violence rates, gun ownership among high-risk
subsets of the population may increase the frequency or seriousness
of violent incidents. This conclusion is directly supported by evidence
that attacks committed with guns are more likely to result in the
death of the victim,231 and indirectly supported by evidence that gun
laws aimed at screening out high-risk groups (such as convicted
criminals and mentally ill persons) from gun acquisition seem to
reduce some kinds of violence.232 Gun owner license laws and
purchase permit laws may reduce homicides and gun accidents,
prohibitions of gun possession by convicted criminals appear to
reduce aggravated assaults and robberies, and bans on possession by
mentally ill persons may reduce homicides.233 This in turn suggests
that improved background screening may reduce gun violence.
One of the most obvious shortcomings of the Brady Act is that it
does not cover transfers of guns among persons who are not licensed
dealers.234 Most serious felons get their guns by means other than
purchases from licensed dealers, and thus are not directly affected by
an instant records check provision by itself.235 Since background
checks on dealer transfers appear to be beneficial, extending them to
cover private transfers of guns is a reasonable next step.236 There is
nothing complicated about how this could work. Private individuals
who want to transfer their gun to a qualified recipient would still be
able to do so, but would have to do so through a licensed dealer
acting as a broker. Prospective transferors would go to a licensed
dealer with the prospective recipient, where the latter would fill out
the usual application form and submit to the same records check that
applies to dealer transfers.237 Criminals strongly motivated to evade
the background checks could do so, but less strongly motivated
prospective gun buyers, particularly those lacking connections with
criminals willing to sell them firearms, could be blocked from

231. Gary Kleck & Karen McElrath, The Effects of Weaponry on Human
Violence, 69 SOC. FORCES 669, 684 (1991).
232. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 276.
233. See id. at 276–77.
234. See Ludwig & Cook, supra note 119, at 585.
235. See WRIGHT & ROSSI, supra note 100, at 182–86.
236. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 388–90.
237. See id.
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obtaining guns. To expect 100 percent evasion is probably as
unrealistic as it would be to expect no evasion.
Bans on purchase and possession also could be extended to persons
convicted of violent misdemeanors. Currently bans of this sort only
apply to domestic violence misdemeanants.238
Extending the
prohibition to cover all violent misdemeanors makes sense because
often the only reason a violent offender was convicted of a
misdemeanor rather than a felony was because it was the product of a
plea bargain, not because the offense was not a felony.
Evidence indicates that laws prohibiting gun possession by
mentally ill persons are effective. While we have little reliable
evidence on which to base forecasts, improvements in records on
dangerous mentally ill persons could make screening for violencelinked mental illness more effective and thereby prevent some gun
violence by such persons. Mental health databases should be made
more comprehensive in coverage of persons found by a court to be
dangerously mentally ill. They also need to be made more accessible
by those performing gun screening, which may require amending
current medical privacy regulations.
The carrying of guns by criminals in public places may increase
robbery rates. This conclusion is supported by evidence that indicates
that robbers are more likely to complete their crimes if they are
armed with a gun, suggesting that gun carrying can thereby encourage
criminals to commit more robberies, especially impulsive or
opportunistic ones.239 Evidence indicating that well-enforced laws
forbidding unlicensed gun carrying may reduce robbery also
indirectly supports this conclusion.240 Therefore, increased police
enforcement of existing laws against unlicensed gun carrying may
help reduce violent gun crimes that entail offender movement
through public spaces, especially those that are not premeditated.
Laws punishing unlicensed gun carrying with mandatory penalties
may reduce robbery,241 even though the penalty provisions appear to
have little impact on the actual levels of punishment inflicted on
offenders.242 One possible explanation of this apparent paradox is
that the mandatory penalty provisions may merely serve as an

238. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006). See generally Vigdor & Mercy, supra
note 112.
239. See KLECK, TARGETING GUNS, supra note 19, at 238.
240. See Kleck & Patterson, Violence Rates, supra note 18, at 276.
241. See id.
242. See KLECK, POINT BLANK, supra note 61, at 343.
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indicator of serious commitment to enforcement among criminal
justice personnel, and that it is actually greater police enforcement of
carry laws that reduces robbery.
Therefore, police departments might experiment with increasing
street searches and arrests for unlawful carrying, and improving the
targeting of searches by training officers in improved techniques for
identifying pedestrians who are carrying concealed weapons. Even in
the absence of increased use of prison sentences for violators,
increased carrying arrests might deter the casual, routine carrying of
firearms, and thereby indirectly reduce unplanned opportunistic
crimes, especially robberies. Currently, most police departments
show little evidence of a serious enforcement effort. Most police
rarely make arrests for any gun violations and confiscate few criminal
guns.243 Thus, there is considerable room for improvement.

243. See id.

